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Introduction
In late December of 2003, to the dismay of Kosovar Albanians as well as
many Serbs, a radical nationalist party with links to former Serbian
President Slobodan Milosevic won the most votes in Serbia’s national
election (Abramowitz 2004). This is just one of many recent events that
demonstrates the high degree of instability in Serbia, especially within the
province of Kosovo. The volatility that today characterizes the Kosovo
region has its roots in the decade preceding the 1999 Kosovo war, when in
response to the disintegration of Yugoslavia the international community
reacted in a confused manner with regards to Kosovo, refusing to
effectively address the territorial dispute between the ethnic Albanian and
Serbian populations there. The 1999 Kosovo war, carried out to stop
Milosevic’s ethnic-cleansing campaign against Kosovar Albanians, was
ultimately successful in halting the killings, but failed to resolve the political
issues behind the fighting - namely, the demands being made by the ethnic
Albanians for independence of Kosovo on the one hand, versus the Serbian
insistence on keeping the province as a part of Serbia. In the four years
since the war, the international community has maintained a policy of
postponement and basic disregard for the decision of ‘final status’ for
Kosovo, which has only served to instill more fear among both opposing
factions, resulting in a province that is as polarized and unstable as ever.
This paper will argue that in the three time periods of (1) the decade before
the Kosovo war, (2) during the war itself, and (3) in the four years after the
war, the international community has acted ambiguously and even
hypocritically regarding the issue of statehood for Kosovo - this being a
pivotal factor in the prolonging and exacerbation of the conflict. Behind
this flawed approach by the international community lies the tension, in
both international law and practice, between the concepts of nation and
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state. This is a tension that, in the case of Kosovo, has resulted in the
international community’s ongoing indecision over what the final status of
Kosovo should be, and has left the province in dire need of a solution.
The Theoretical Tension Between ‘Nation’ and ‘State’
Before delving into the specifics of the Kosovo conflict, it is
important to first discuss the concepts of nation and state and the
theoretical debate that surrounds these two terms. First of all, according to
The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, the definition of a nation is
“…a vague notion which refers to a social collectivity, the members of
which share some or all of the following: a sense of common identity, a
history, a language, ethnic or racial origins, religion, a common economic
life, a geographical location and a political base” (Evans and Newnham
1998, 343). As for the definition of a state, it is said to possess “a
permanent population, a defined territory and a government capable of
maintaining effective control over its territory and of conducting
international relations with other states” (Evans and Newnham 1998, 512).
However, neither of these definitions is absolute. Regarding a nation, for
example, none of the criteria are “…either necessary or sufficient for
definition. Nations can exist without a distinct political identity (e.g. the
Jewish nation during the Diaspora) and they can exist without common
linguistic, cultural, religious or ethnic components (e.g. the Indian nation)”
(Evans and Newnham 1998, 343). And regarding a state, it need not
maintain a defined territory or a government capable of exercising control.
“Israel, for example, is generally accepted as a state even though the precise
demarcation of its boundaries has never been settled”, and The Penguin
Dictionary of International Relations further notes that “…a state does not cease
to exist when control is in dispute or when it [the government] is
‘temporarily’ deprived of effective control as in wartime, civil wars, or
revolutions” (Evans and Newnham 1998, 513).
Nevertheless, when there is a fusion of these entities a ‘nationstate’ is said to exist (Keating and McGarry eds. 2001, 1). The nation-state
is classified as “…the dominant political entity of the modern world and as
such can be considered to be the primary unit of international relations”
(Evans and Newnham 1998, 343-344). The concept of a nation-state is a
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fairly recent one, having its origins in the period following the collapse of
the Holy Roman Empire and the subsequent “…emergence of the
centralized state claiming exclusive and monopolistic authority within a
defined territorial area” (Evans and Newnham 1998, 344). The Peace of
Westphalia in 1648, recognized as having founded the modern state system,
marked the intensification of the nation-states’ development. Then, in what
is known as ‘the rise of nations’ phenomenon - which was fuelled by antiimperialist movements, ethnic conflicts, and secessionist movements - there
took place a vast expansion in the number of states, from approximately
two dozen in the late 18th century, to around 200 by the year 2000
(Ambrosio 2002, 341).
Today the nation-state is considered to be not only the ideal, but
also the most ‘normal,’ political unit (Evans and Newnham 1998, 344).
However, most nation-states are actually not nearly as ethnically
homogeneous as what the name implies. Rather, most of the units that the
international community calls ‘states’ today are ethnically and culturally
quite diverse. Thus in reality, as political scientists Raymond C. Taras and
Rajat Ganguly note, “The international community…is primarily (but not
exclusively) a community of states…” rather than pure nation-states (Taras
and Ganguly 2001, 32). This is reflected in the fact that in both
international law and practice there is a strong bias towards states over
nations (Chesterman, Farer, and Sisk 2000). For example, for a nation to
become a member of the United Nations (UN) and thus be recognized as a
state, it must be a “political entity defined by spatial territorial boundaries.
Those peoples or groupings who fall outside this rubric (e.g. the Kurds)
appear therefore not to possess the relevant criteria” (Evans and Newnham
1998, 343). Closely related with this are the issues of sovereignty and selfdetermination. Part of the bias currently held by the international
community towards states is related to the priority given to state
sovereignty rather than to minority claims for self-determination and other
actions that could represent the diminishing power of a state (Chesterman,
Farer, and Sisk 2000).
This bias is even reflected in international law documents such as
Article 8(4) of the UN’s Declaration on Minorities, which consistently
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repeats the following refrain: “Nothing in the present Declaration may be
construed as permitting any activity contrary to the purposes and principles
of the United Nations, including sovereign equality, territorial integrity and
political independence of States” (Ambrosio 2002, 348). When there have
been attempts made by various international bodies to enhance the rights of
nations, there has been critical reaction from major states such as Russia,
China, and India, who are not willing to experience any weakening of their
sovereignty (Thomas ed. 2003, 4). Thus, in the current age it is somewhat
difficult for nations to acquire the status of statehood, as can be seen from
the numerous ongoing struggles by peoples such as the Chechens, Tamils,
and of course, the Kosovar Albanians, for legal state recognition.
Yet, while this bias toward states is important to note, it is the
international community’s confused and ambiguous approach towards the
whole issue that best describes the tension between nations and states. As
the previously discussed definitions demonstrate, the terms ‘nation’ and
‘state’ are laden with ambiguity and imprecision, incapable of specifically
identifying what the necessary and sufficient criteria are for either of them.
This confusion is further compounded in international law. While clauses
such as the above-mentioned UN Article 8(4) clearly specifies the
predominance of state sovereignty, there are also documents such as that of
UN Article 2(5), which not only acknowledges “…the existence of crossborder nations and the need for members of a national group to maintain
contacts with their ethnic kin in other countries…” but also has “a nascent
willingness to move beyond recognition of cultural and linguistic rights, and
to insist that only enhanced rights of political participation for minorities
can adequately protect their interests” (Ambrosio 2002, 345). What
becomes obvious with this passage that explicitly calls for attention to
minority groups is the hypocrisy existing in international law.
Consequently, with no uniform international legal standards to work with,
the international community confronts a problem when trying to decide
whether or not to allow a group to be recognized as a state.
Many international relations and legal scholars have called for a
reevaluation of the notions of nation and state. Specifically, they have
suggested that the state-centric international system seek to increase the
accommodation of nations and decrease the bias currently held against, for
example, ethno-nationalists, and ethno-secessionist movements (Taras and
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Ganguly 2001, 42). Perhaps what is needed, some say, is for the model of
political units to be a ‘multi-ethnic state’ rather than the so-called nationstate (Evans and Newnham 1998, 344). The trend of certain states in
seeking ethnic homogeneity through practices such as creating myths of
ethnic unity and using ethnic-cleansing - as has occurred in Kosovo for
example - indeed suggests that a reconceptualization of the concepts of
nation, state, and especially nation-state, is needed. And yet others are
worried that such reassessment could result in a decline in stability and
order in the international arena (Evans 2001, 8).
Thus, what this tension between nation and state demonstrates
above all is the need for a uniform consensus on these issues in both
international law and practice. Consistency among the international
community’s actions when it comes to dealing with issues of nationality and
statehood is crucial. For, without uniformity in practice, situations like that
of Kosovo needlessly become prolonged and exacerbated conflicts. Having
covered the theoretical problem inherent in the notions of nation and state,
this paper next turns to how that problem has affected the Kosovo conflict,
beginning with the time period before the 1999 Kosovo war.
Before the War
The roots of the animosity between the ethnic Albanians and
Serbians within Kosovo can be traced back many centuries, with the 1389
Battle of Kosovo serving as a marker for many as the beginning of
hostilities (Buckley and Cummings eds. 2001, 13). While in reality that
battle was probably fought with Albanians and Serbians together on the
same side, it has been interpreted by the Serbs as an important event in
their history that demonstrates the significance of the Kosovo land in
historical, cultural, and religious terms for the Serbian people (Daalder and
O’Hanlon 2000, 6-7). Throughout the centuries, such events have been
mythologized and ultimately misconstrued by both sides, helping to foster
and facilitate a climate of intolerance and hatred between them. In fact, the
groups had created two entirely different and contrasting conceptions of
history by the 20th century (Buckley and Cummings eds. 2001, 14). Both
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claimed not only original inhabitancy of the land, but exclusive rights to it
as well (Thomas ed. 2003, 65). In 1912 Serbia gained control of Kosovo after both had been ruled for the past few centuries by the Ottoman
Empire - only to lose it during World War One. In the period following
the war, Kosovo was arbitrarily made a province of Serbia when both were
incorporated into the newly created state of Yugoslavia. Unlike in previous
eras, during the Yugoslav period acts of repression between the two groups
were kept to a minimum, as the Albanians and Serbians maintained very
separate communal lives in Kosovo (Buckley and Cummings eds. 2001, 15).
As part of Tito’s ‘ethno-national devolution’ attempt, Kosovo was
granted a great deal of autonomy in the 1974 constitution (Buckley and
Cummings eds. 2001, 16). Kosovo’s status was effectively changed from
provincial to republic, as it was granted all of the same rights that the six
other Yugoslav republics enjoyed. It essentially was made a ‘virtual
republic’ (Caplan 1998, 748). For example, it was granted equal
representation in Yugoslav government bodies, as well as its own
parliament, courts, police force, and national banks (Buckley and
Cummings eds. 2001, 16). Constitutionally, however, the Kosovars were
still lacking the official statehood status that the other republics had, and
thus the period from 1974 to the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1989 witnessed
Albanian demands for greater autonomy. These demands, as well as the
fact that the Albanian birth rate in Kosovo was significantly higher than
that of the Serbs (by the 1990’s Kosovo consisted of 90% Albanians), led
not only to increasing resentment on the part of the Serbs, but more
importantly to a growing sense of nationalism among them as well (Thomas
ed. 2003, 65). When Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic came onto the
political scene in the late 1980’s he was able to manipulate and capitalize on
this Serbian self-identity movement, eventually stripping away all of
Kosovo’s autonomy by 1990 (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000, 8). In the
period between the dissolving of the province’s powers and the outbreak of
the Kosovo war, the ethnic Albanians suffered extensive human rights
abuses under the rule of Milosevic’s nationalist government (Abrahams
2000).
The international community realized very early that Kosovo was
essentially a ‘powder keg’ ready to erupt into violence at any moment during
the 1990’s (Schnabel and Thakur 2000, 7). In spite of that, international
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bodies and governments largely ignored the situation and acted incoherently
and inconsistently during the few times that attention was paid to the
region. The confused international reaction to the Kosovo situation was
first demonstrated when various republics within Yugoslavia began to claim
their independence; Kosovo was included in this movement when it
declared the Republic of Kosova in 1991. After Slovenia and Croatia had
proclaimed their autonomy, the European Community (now the European
Union, or EU) established the Badinter Commission, which had the task of
examining the legal status of the various entities of the dissolving Yugoslav
federation. In late 1991 the Commission declared that “Yugoslavia was ‘in
the process of dissolution’ and that the republics seeking independence
were therefore not rebel entities but… ‘new states…created on the territory
of the former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]’” (Caplan
1998, 747). What this consequently implied for the international
community was that support could therefore be given to these new states,
as they were not technically seceding - an act considered to be in opposition
of the UN Charter (Caplan 1998, 747). For Kosovo, however, no support
could be granted, as it had never officially been given republic status, even
though in all aspects other than title it was considered to be a republic. As
author Richard Caplan notes, “were it not for an arcane constitutional
principle Kosovo might very well have been a republic” (Caplan 1998, 747).
While the quite arbitrary distinctions between republics and provinces had
been made during the communist era, the international community deemed
such demarcations to be easy and hassle-free determinants of statehood.
Thus, extremely multi-ethnic states such as Bosnia were granted
independence, while Kosovo, a very ethnically homogenous unit, was
denied state status (Taras and Ganguly 2001, 259).
What essentially developed then within the Kosovo territory was a
‘parallel state’ structure (Thomas ed. 2003, 65). Having lost its parliament,
constitution, and basically all state functions in 1990, and then being denied
independence in1991, the Kosovar Albanians built up numerous parallel
state institutions that quite successfully addressed areas such as health care,
education, and social assistance (Buckley and Cummings eds. 2001, 18).
Kosovar Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova and his Democratic League of
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Kosovo encouraged this parallel state arrangement in the hope of proving
Kosovo’s ability to operate as a state to the international community.
Rugova furthermore preached non-violence to his subjects, determined not
to give the Serbs an excuse to attempt to expel or exterminate the
Albanians. Rugova was sure that this ‘good behavior,’ together with the
results of a referendum - which had proven that an overwhelming majority
of Kosovars wanted independence - would coalesce into the eventual
granting of autonomy (Buckley and Cummings eds. 2001, 18). However,
his efforts were of no avail, as not only was there no recognition of
independence, but the international community seemed to have forgotten
about the plight of Kosovo altogether. For example, despite the fact that
many analysts of the Yugoslav conflict had recognized that any peace
agreements made would have to comprehensively address the issue of
national minorities throughout the entire former Yugoslavia, the Dayton
Agreement that was signed in 1995 to end the Bosnian war dealt with no
such issue (Caplan 1998, 750). In fact, Kosovo was not discussed to any
significant degree in the accords. This was largely done because it was
thought, especially by the American and Western European governments,
that doing so would push Milosevic too far after he had just ‘cooperated’ in
the Dayton peace process (Caplan 1998, 750). Furthermore, because there
was no overt violence in the Kosovo region - mainly due to Rugova’s
peaceful resistance tactics - the international community felt there to be no
urgent need to tackle the problems there (Thomas ed. 2003, 65).
As a result of so little constructive attention given to the repression
being suffered by the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, Rugova’s non-violent
tactics were abandoned. Realizing that there could be no improvement in
the situation as long as Kosovo remained a low priority for American and
European policy-makers, many Albanians turned to violence to not only
fend off the Serbs, but more importantly, to gain the attention of the world
community (Abrahams 2000). The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) gained
prominence and was soon engaged in aggressive hostilities against Serb
authorities. Needless to say, the violence level in Kosovo began to
dramatically escalate. The international community did take some notice,
and several measures were taken to curb Serbian criminal behavior. Yet,
efforts were only half-hearted and foreign governments and bodies still
refused to see Kosovo as anything but an integral component of the state
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of Serbia (Thomas ed. 2003, 65). As a result of this outlook, any action
taken by the international community towards Kosovo was focused not on
the underlying political issues such as self-determination or national rights,
but rather on simply protecting human rights (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000,
9). Consequently, it was not until a brutal March 1998 Serbian massacre of
Albanians in which eighty-five people were murdered did groups such as
NATO seriously consider taking overt action against the Milosevic regime
in Kosovo (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000, 11).
Thus, during the time period leading-up to the international
community’s 1998 consideration of directing actual force against the
Serbian perpetrators, it is quite apparent that the flawed and ambiguous
concepts of nation and state had a negative affect on international behavior.
Since there was no precise and definitive legal norms with regards to when
a nation - such as the ethnic Albanians - should be granted the right to form
their own state, action taken by foreign governments and international
bodies was incoherent. The Kosovar Albanians were granted different
status - for arbitrary reasons - in comparison to the other national groups
within the dissolving federation, and this different treatment proved to be a
key factor in the continuation and escalation of hostilities (Caplan 1998,
746). For example, after watching the international community refuse to
ratify borders to create an independent Kosovo, but then watching the
violent parties involved in the Bosnian conflict being granted permission to
change their boundaries, many ethnic Albanians drew the conclusion that,
as the editor-in-chief of the Pristina daily, Koha Ditore, said, “international
attention can only be obtained through war” (Caplan 1998, 752).
Consequently, non-violent tactics were shelved in favor of the violent
strategies of the militarily-oriented pro-separatist KLA, and as a result,
hostilities in Kosovo worsened.
Hence, it becomes evident that if there is to be any sort of adequate
response by the international community to conflicts involving statehood
and national issues, a uniform consensus on the subjects of nation and state
is needed in both international law and practice. The need for this is seen
equally as strongly in the period surrounding the Kosovo war, to which this
paper turns to next.
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During the War
As previously mentioned, the March 1998 massacre signaled to the
United States (US) and Western European governments that they would
have to take substantial action to halt the hostilities in the province. Even
so, international efforts at first were disjointed and ineffective. The US
took the initiative, sending to Belgrade ‘special representative for the
implementation of the Dayton Agreement,’ Robert S. Gelbard (Buckley and
Cummings eds. 2001, 19). In determining the situation within Kosovo,
Gelbard actually arrived at a positive assessment of the Serbian regime,
praising Milosevic for his peacemaking efforts in the Dayton process. Not
only was a reduction in Serbian sanctions suggested, but much to the Serbs’
delight, on Gelbard’s visit to the Kosovo capital of Pristina he said that the
KLA “is, without any question, a terrorist group”, and furthermore, that the
US “condemns very strongly terrorist activities in Kosovo” (Caplan 1998,
753). Essentially having given Serbian authorities a legitimate pretext to
launch attacks on these ‘terrorists,’ Milosevic thus began a Serbian offensive
a week after Gelbard’s visit. Secretary-General of the ruling Serbian
Socialist Party, Gorica Gajevic, explained the ensuing burning and looting
of Albanian villages, the executions, and the general brutality when he said,
“Serbia will fight terrorism the same way the rest of the world does”
(Caplan 1998, 754).
The hostilities in turn stimulated more support for the KLA, and
thousands of ethnic Albanians joined the fight. Attitudes like that of Ad em
Demaci, leader of one of Kosovo’s strongest political parties, became
common: “I will not condemn the tactics of the [KLA] because the path of
nonviolence has gotten us nowhere…The [KLA] is fighting for our
freedom” (Caplan 1998, 752). By June 1998, with a full-fledged
insurrectionary war taking place, not only had over 350 people been killed
in the fighting but approximately 60,000 Kosovars had become refugees,
many having fled into Albania (Buckley and Cummings eds. 2001, 19). The
potential destabilization of the broader region that refugees could cause,
together with dramatic media coverage of the atrocities, helped to stimulate
a somewhat more effective, though still not totally adequate, response from
the international community (Pavkovic 2000, 191).
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The International Contact Group for the Former Yugoslavia which
included the US, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia, finally
condemned the Serbians’ “use of excessive force by [their] police against
civilians” (Buckley and Cummings eds. 2001, 20). The UN Security Council
shortly thereafter passed Resolution 1160 which placed an arms embargo
on the region. After that there were an additional series of diplomatic
measures, culminating with UN Security Council Resolution 1199 in
September 1998, which called for “immediate action” to halt the fighting in
Kosovo which had by that time produced 200,000 refugees (Schnabel and
Thakur 2000, 12-13). Almost immediately following the resolution, NATO
began to plan for military action, and negotiations were attempted between
Milosevic and American Ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke. The
October 1998 agreement that Holbrooke eventually managed to secure with
Milosevic was faulty on many levels. First of all, it simply demanded that
Serbs revert to the police and military levels that had existed prior to
February 1998 (Buckley and Cummings eds. 2001, 21). This was not only
an extremely generous condition for the Serbian authorities but, more
importantly, it failed to address the root cause of the Kosovo crisis, which
of course was the political status of Kosovo. Furthermore, the agreement
was signed without the support of the KLA, making it a one-sided peace
settlement (Buckley and Cummings eds. 2001, 21). Predictably, the socalled peace did not last long and by February 1999 new peace talks, cochaired by British and French Foreign Ministers, were being held in
Rambouillet, France. On March 20, after the talks had been suspended
because of a walkout by the Serb delegation, a major Serb offensive was
launched in Kosovo, which finally prompted NATO to begin its bombing
campaign on March 24.
The main objectives of the air strikes were to force Milosevic ‘back
to the negotiating table’ and thereby halt a humanitarian catastrophe
(Schnabel and Thakur 2000, 13). NATO’s expectation that this would
simply take a few days was reflected in its willingness to only take limited
actions and its decision to, for example, rule out the use of ground force
(Evans 2001, 6). However, Milosevic immediately began a brutal policy of
ethnic-cleansing that by the end of the seventy-eight day war had resulted in

28

Critique: A worldwide student journal of politics
850,000 ethnic Albanian refugees, between 300,000-400,000 internally
displaced people within Kosovo, and approximately 10,000 killed
(Abrahams 2000). Although it took much more time and effort than
NATO had anticipated, by June 1999, NATO had managed to convince
Serb commanders to withdraw military forces from Kosovo. Peace was
formally instigated on June 10 by UN Security Council Resolution 1244.
NATO itself considered the war to have been a great achievement: a
successful air campaign that achieved the original objectives, and low losses
of life in terms of both civilian casualties and NATO personnel (Daalder
and O’Hanlon 2000, 4-5).
While cessation of hostilities and limited casualties are definitely
commendable achievements, the Kosovo war was nevertheless deeply
flawed in many respects. The most obvious failure was NATO’s inability to
avert Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing campaign, mainly the result of NATO
doing too little, too late. Furthermore, there were some governments who
were very wary of not only the fact that NATO went ahead with its mission
despite no UN backing, but also that such activity could set dangerous
precedents. One Indian newspaper captured this sentiment when it printed,
“NATO aggression on Yugoslavia: Today Kosovo, Tomorrow Kashmir?”
(Ambrosio 2002, 349) However, the most major failure, and the one to
cause the most serious repercussions, was the lack of attention paid to
finding a political solution for the territory. Professors A.J.R. Groom and
Paul Taylor describe this mistake by saying, “it is dangerous to base action
on axiomatic principles without reflection. Insisting on no partition, no
independence, enforced multi-ethnicity, and no questioning of borders
imposed constraints on the possibilities of compromise” (Schnabel and
Thakur 2000, 38). Although NATO had planned to address governing
arrangements following the war - and its inadequate attempts to do so will
be discussed later in this paper - no serious consideration during this time
period was given to what the territorial status of Kosovo should be.
This can be seen in the contradictory statements made by the
American government, for example. In the week before the
commencement of the NATO air strikes, then-US President Bill Clinton
stated, “With our NATO allies and with Russia, we proposed a peace
agreement to stop the killing and give the people of Kosovo the selfdetermination and government they need and to which they are entitled
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under the constitution of their government” (Ambrosio 2002, 344-345).
This statement would seem to suggest American support for the selfdetermination of the ethnic Albanian people, and therefore their right to
statehood. However, in numerous other addresses, the issues of selfdetermination and state status were altogether left out. For example, in
Clinton’s speech to his country regarding the initiation of NATO bombing
he said,
“Our strikes have three objectives. First, to demonstrate the
seriousness of NATO’s opposition to aggression and its support for
peace. Second, to deter President Milosevic from continuing and
escalating his attacks on helpless civilians by imposing a price for
those attacks. And third, if necessary, to damage Serbia’s capacity to
wage war against Kosovo in the future by seriously diminishing its
military capabilities” (Ambrosio 2002, 347).
In one address to the Serbian people, in fact, Clinton declared, “the
NATO allies support the desire of the Serbian people to maintain Kosovo
as part of your country” (Ambrosio 2002, 347). And both during the war
and immediately afterwards, Secretary of State Madeline Albright as well as
State Department spokesman James Rubin claimed on behalf of the US that
“we have alw ays said we do not support independence for Kosovo, and we
do not support independence for Kosovo now” (Ambrosio 2002, 347).
Such contradictory statements were echoed in UN Security Council
resolutions, which had the tendency to stress ‘self-administration’ and ‘selfgovernment’ for the Kosovar people, but not ‘self-determination’
(Ambrosio 2002, 347). Thus, in combination with the actions taken by the
international community in the decade before the Kosovo war - in
particular the arbitrary recognition of some former Yugoslav states but not
others - together with the contradictory messages to the Kosovar people
during the war regarding what their political status would be, an impression
of an incapable and arbitrary international system was allowed to develop.
And indeed, the international system in this respect is arbitrary. Without a
clear formula of how to address crises involving self-determination,
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nationality, and statehood, any action taken by the international community
will both appear and will be illogical and hypocritical. And the consequence
of this confused system, for conflicts like Kosovo, is that no quick and
adequate resolution will take place. This is demonstrated nowhere more
obviously than in the time period immediately after the war and to the
present day in Kosovo - a topic which this paper will now discuss.
Following the War
UN Security Council Resolution 1244 that was passed at the end of
the Kosovo war not only formally marked the end of the fighting, but also
established stipulations for the province to be run as a joint UN and NATO
Yugoslav protectorate, as opposed to being strictly under Belgrade’s
control. A UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was
arranged to ‘constitute the transitional administration for the region’ (Taras
and Ganguly 2001, 253). UNMIK’s principle areas of focus include police
and justice, civil administration, democratization and institution building,
and reconstruction and economic development (Abrahams 2000). Several
other bodies, such as the EU and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe play fundamental roles in the operation of those tasks
as well. The resolution also established a Kosovo Peacekeeping Force
(KFOR) consisting of soldiers from various NATO countries. KFOR’s
nearly 40,000 troops are centered in five main areas of the province with
the responsibility of ‘keeping the peace’ (Abrahams 2000). While
Resolution 1244 was important in that it provided for both a provisional
method of governing Kosovo as well as a temporary means to ensure
peace, it neglected to address the future final status of Kosovo (Buckley and
Cummings eds. 2001, 26-27). This has made UNMIK’s governing of the
province difficult, as well as KFOR’s task of guaranteeing security and
stability. Ultimately, this has proven to be the factor most responsible for
the continuing unrest within the province.
UNMIK and KFOR did share some immediate success in
providing for the safe return of nearly all of the 1.3 million ethnic Albanian
refugees who had been displaced during Milosevic’s rule (Daalder and
O’Hanlon 2000, 4). However, neither of them proved capable of
preventing the expulsion from Kosovo of over 250,000 non-Albanians -
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mostly Serbs and Roma - by KLA revenge attacks (Schnabel and Thakur
2000, 13). Since 1999 the track record of both UNMIK and KFOR has
been mixed at best. On the positive side, the level of violence within
Kosovo has decreased tenfold since 1999, the province operates its own
police force and judiciary, and Milosevic is currently on trial for war crimes
in the Hague (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000, 16). However, the pressing
reality is that today the lack of a consensus on a final status and the
consequent unresolved animosity and tension between the ethnic Albanians
and Serbians within Kosovo has turned the political situation into a zerosum game: the majority Albanians will now accept no less than
independence, and the minority Serbians remain steadfast in their demand
to be a part of Serbia (International Crisis Group 2003). With little sign that
the international community will be addressing Kosovo’s permanent
political status anytime soon, the ethnic Albanians and Serbs grow more
suspicious and distrustful of each other by the day, and ultimately
increasingly fearful of the future (Price 2003, 2).
The lack of clarity regarding Kosovo’s status has hurt its
development in other ways as well. The Stabilization and Association
Process (SAP), the principal instrument in preparing Balkan states for
incorporation into the EU, has been instrumental in guiding the states
around Kosovo towards integration into the European community (United
States Institute of Peace 2002, 2). However, SAP requires its subjects to be
sovereign states, and thus Kosovo is unable to participate, making it very
likely that it will soon be ‘left behind’ politically and economically (United
States Institute of Peace 2002, 2). Kosovo’s economic situation is further
hindered by the fact that few foreign investors wish to become involved in
the region. The unclear status of Kosovo and its unpromising future
severely discourages any kind of foreign economic involvement or
investment in the province. This has resulted in poor economic conditions
characterized by statistics such as a 60% unemployment rate (Price 2003, 2).
With regards to Kosovo’s political condition, its governmental development
is being compromised by UNMIK procedures. ‘Standards before status’ is
the policy at the heart of UNMIK operations (Abramowitz 2003). That
essentially equates to Kosovo having to meet certain ‘benchmarks’ before
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being able to govern itself (United States Institute of Peace 2002, 3).
However, these benchmarks are conditions few other Balkan states have
even come close to achieving, and thus the expectation that Kosovo, with
its already extremely limited powers, should meet these goals before being
granted the institutions of self-governance is highly unfair. Moreover, no
adequate plans or programs have been developed to help Kosovars reach
the benchmarks, nor have assessments been completed regarding any
progress made (Abramowitz 2003). Kosovars are as a result very frustrated,
especially with the fact that UNMIK still has principal control over political
arenas like the constitution, the calling of elections, and foreign affairs
(United States Institute of Peace 2002, 3).
UMMIK has responded by stressing that sovereignty and
statehood are merely symbolic issues (International Crisis Group 2003).
Yet it is clear in the case of Kosovo that political matters are far from
simply symbolic and are instead considered pivotal issues by Kosovo’s
people (International Crisis Group 2003). As previously (though briefly)
mentioned, while the level of overt violence within Kosovo has decreased,
societal conditions remain very poor. The situation of the Serbs within
Kosovo, for example, is coming to mirror that of the ethnic Albanians
during the 1990’s. The Serbs - and frequently the Roma as well - are
restricted from freely using their languages, are deprived of access to many
Kosovar institutions, and attacks towards them by Albanians are quite
common (Matic 2004). These conditions have two negative effects: firstly,
they encourage the Serbs and Roma to settle in isolated enclaves away from
the ethnic Albanians, thus creating a very polarized state, and secondly, the
Serbs’ and Roma’s perceptions that UNMIK and KFOR are poorly
providing for their safety in the face of such atrocities drives them to
support radical nationalist Serbian parties (Matic 2004). As Simbad, a
Roma, explained, “We are locked up in this village and I’m sure the Radicals
are the only ones who can help us regain all the freedoms we lost after
1999” (Matic 2004). Attitudes like that help to explain why the Serbian
Radical Party, led by Vojislav Seselj who is currently on trial in the Hague,
won the most seats in Serbia’s December 2003 national election (Cvijanovic
2004). The support of Kosovar Serbs and Roma for such radical politics is
unlikely to wane as long as final status is put off and the fear am ong the
groups is allowed to fester.
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Balkan experts and academics have discussed and advocated
various solutions to Kosovo’s continuing problems. To begin with, it is
virtually unanimously agreed upon that the West must not delay the
decision over Kosovo’s final status any longer (International Crisis Group
2002a). Not only has this interim protectorate condition proven itself
unworkable, but the lack of long-term planning for the province is
discouraging development in economic, political, and societal terms. What
this equates to is the need for dedicated and constructive assistance from
the international community (Price 2003, 3). UNMIK must, for example,
either disregard the benchmark program or make the goals more realistic
and explicitly demonstrate their linkage with obtaining self-government.
UNMIK must also be willing to hand-over more powers to the Kosovo
people in order to prepare them for some kind of self-government
(Abramowitz 2003). Furthermore, unless willing to become actively
involved, the international community must stop their insistence that
Kosovo and the Serbian government hold negotiations (Abramowitz 2003).
Kosovo has no real powers of its own at the moment, whereas Serbia is a
full-fledged state. It is important that the two parties have dialogue, and
indeed there are many issues that need to be discussed, but unless
negotiations are conducted on fair terms they simply serve as fodder for
extremist attitudes.
Moreover, the international community must think in more
proactive rather than reactive terms. This means, for example,
strengthening KFOR to be able to prevent conflict from erupting on the
Albanian and Macedonian borders, as the upsurge in extremism among
both the Kosovar Albanians and Serbians has increased the likelihood that
the broader region will become destabilized (Greenberg 2001, 3). And
while KFOR and UNMIK were too slow in reacting to the expulsion of
Serbs from the province after the war, they can now act proactively by
providing a safe environment for their return. A major boost in ethnic
relations could occur not only if more of the Serbs were allowed to come
back to their homes, but if they were able to do so in an atmosphere of
security and hospitality (International Crisis Group 2002c).
These are just some of many measures needed to be taken by the
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international community if Kosovo is to see any progress. What these
measures all stem from, however, is the need to address the final status
issue. In one means or another, all problematic matters in Kosovo are
related to the lack of clarity regarding the province’s future. Even the
return of Serbian refugees, for example, has been politicized to such an
extent because of Kosovo’s unresolved status that it makes it highly unlikely
that the more than 190,000 remaining displaced people will return home
anytime soon (Avidiu and Vujisic 2003, 3). While there is at the moment no
clear consensus on what exactly Kosovo’s political status should become whether it should be partitioned, be granted autonomy with Serbia, be given
full independence, and so on - there is an acknowledgment among most
scholars that at least some autonomy is vital for Kosovo, in addition to a
democratic and ethnically representative government (International Crisis
Group 2002b). The International Crisis Group, in its recent report on
Kosovo, suggested that the province be granted ‘Conditional
Independence’ which they described as “…a way out of the impasse”
(International Crisis Group 2002a). Conditional independence “…would
allow the international community to retain essential influence over local
Albanian leaders. Having secured independence from Belgrade, but
remaining on probation, the Kosovo Albanians would have a strong
incentive to ensure that Kosovo would cease to be a factor of regional
instability” (International Crisis Group 2002a). Because this option both
grants autonomy to the ethnic Albanians, but at the same time makes that
autonomy conditional upon ‘good behavior’ - especially in the field of
ensuring fair treatment to the Serbs - this is perhaps the most viable
alternative suggested to date.
Even more important than the political design of Kosovo,
however, is that it simply be decided upon soon. The stakes are clearly too
high for the decision to be held off any longer; the conflict has already been
too prolonged and exacerbated. There are a range of factors holding the
international community back from addressing final status: fear of opening
‘Pandora’s Box’ to a multitude of future secessionist movements, for
example, and a simple decline in interest in the region since the end of the
war (United States Institute of Peace 2002). Yet the primary reason comes
from the international community’s confusion over the concepts of nation
and state, as well as the related issues of self-determination and sovereignty.
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As mentioned before, with a lack of clarity and established consensus over
when a nation should be granted the right to form its own state, foreign
governments and international bodies are left searching for ad equate
answers. Their grappling for a solution to Kosovo’s final status is directly
the result of the ambiguous, arbitrary, and hypocritical characteristics of the
nation and state dilemma in international law and practice.
Conclusion
Commenting on the numerous international conflicts of the 1990’s,
former Australian Foreign Minister and leader of the International Crisis
Group, Garth Evans, said, “If we’ve learned anything from these
catastrophes that have haunted us throughout the 1990s, it is that they
haven’t occurred like conventional wars demanding conventional military
responses” (Evans 2001, 7). Indeed, Kosovo was - and still is - an example
of one of those catastrophes that called for new approaches to the art of
conflict management - NATO’s bombing campaign being a prime example
of that. However, what Kosovo desperately needed was a unified and
effective response from the international community. Due to the lack of a
clear and formulated consensus on nationality and statehood issues, none
came. Before and during the Kosovo war, despite attitudes like that of
former Dutch foreign minister Willem Van Eekelen who asked, “…why
make a difference in principle between, say, Slovenia and Kosovo when
fundamental human rights are being crushed?”, arbitrary decisions were
made regarding the political status of Kosovo that helped in numerous ways
to extend the conflict (Caplan 1998, 761). Since then, “the war with bombs
has ended but not the political war”, as newspaper editor Veton Surroi
explained, and the province is still awaiting its long-due status decision
(International Crisis Group 2003). If there is to be any hope of ending the
international community’s practice of prolonging and exacerbating the
Kosovo crisis, or of putting a stop to the violence in the Balkan Peninsula
in general, the tension between nations and states will have to resolved. It
remains to be seen whether this issue that has been pestering international
politics for so long will be put to a rest in time to save Kosovo.
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